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ABSTRACT. This investigation concerns first what Jacques Derrida and Paul
Ricœur consider to be «the question of writing» in Plato’s  Phaedrus, and
then  whether  their  conception  of  a  general  philosophical  problem  of
writing finds support  in  the dialogue.  By contrast  to  their  attempts  to
«determine»  the  «status»  of  writing  as  the  general  condition  of
knowledge, my investigation has two objections. (1) To show that Plato’s
concern is  not  to define  writing,  but  to reflect  on what  is  involved in
honest and dishonest inquiry. (2) To argue that Derrida’s and Ricœur’s
determination  of  the  instrumental (epistemic  and  moral)  «status»  of
writing,  overlooks  crucial  difficulties  of  dishonest  writing  that  Plato’s
discussion of the pharmakon reveals. The argument proposed is that honest
and dishonest inquiry is not tied to the moral status that writing, as an
invention or instrument, unconditionally involves, but to the moral quality
of what a human being does when inquiring. 
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1. Introduction
In Memory, History, Forgetting, Paul Ricœur writes:
I shall speak in the manner of Plato’s  Phaedrus of the mythic
birth of the writing of history. That this extension of the myth
of the origin of writing may sound like a myth of the origin of
history,  thanks  to  rewriting,  is,  if  I  may  put  it  this  way,
authorized by the myth itself, inasmuch as what is at stake is
fate of memory, even if the irony is directed in the first place at
the ‘written discourses’ of orators such as Lysias. [...] But it is
to true memory, genuine memory, that the invention of writing
and its related drugs is opposed as a threat. How then can the
debate between memory and history not be affected by this
myth?
To get quickly to the point,  what fascinates me, as it  does
Jacques Derrida, is the insurmountable ambiguity attached to
the pharmakon [elixir/medicine/poison] that the god offers the
king. My question: must  we not ask whether the writing of
history, too, is remedy or poison?1 
I begin with this quote because it is a statement about the (epistemic
and  moral)  status of  the  «invention  of  writing».  This  and  similar
statements  that  define  the  general  character  of  writing  will  be  the
object of my investigation. Let me therefore begin by explaining closely
Ricœur’s  line of  thought in this  particular  discussion.  First,  Ricœur
alludes to Jacques Derrida’s propositions in Of Grammatology; namely
that «writing is the condition of the episteme» and «historicity itself is
tied  to  the  possibility  of  writing».2 Writing,  both  for  Derrida  and
Ricœur,  is  the  condition  of  knowledge  and historical  identity.3 The
status  of  the  «invention  of  writing»,  Ricœur  says,  will  hence  be  a
1 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 141.
2 DERRIDA 1997 [1967], 27.
3 DERRIDA 1997  [1967],  3-4,  27,  121-2;  cf.  RICŒUR 2006  [2000],  138-40,  351-2,  497-9;  de
CERTEAU 1988 [1975], 209-10.
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«background  music»  to  our  «epistemological  inquiry»  about  what
history  as  a  specific  form  of  writing  about  the  past  will  involve.4
Second, Ricœur alludes to settling the character of the «invention of
writing» as fleshed out by Plato in the  Phaedrus,5 and by Derrida in
Plato’s  Pharmacy.6 In  Derrida’s  and  Ricœur’s  reading,  the  Phaedrus
shows that writing is  a  pharmakon  (elixir,  medicine,  poison);  a drug
that  supplements  authentic  memory,  alienates  us  from  reality,  and
poisons  our  minds.  The  invention  of  writing,  it  is  argued,  has  an
indeterminate  meaning,  and  therefore  one  ought  to  be  suspicious
towards it.7
At stake, in this discussion, is not only an epistemic problem peculiar
to historiography, but a general philosophical problem concerning the
very idea of what writing as a «condition of the episteme» must involve.
Derrida and Ricœur read the Phaedrus with the attempt to settle what
the «status» of writing generally is as a condition of knowledge.
Although Derrida, and particularly Ricœur, relate «the question of
writing» in the  Phaedrus  to our idea of historiography, I am not here
concerned  with  problems  that  characterize  historiography  in
particular,  for  example  retrospectivity  or  narrativity.8 Instead,  this
investigation concerns first what Derrida and Ricœur consider to be
«the  question  of  writing»  in  the  Phaedrus,  and  then  whether  their
conception  of  a  general  philosophical  problem  of  writing  finds
support in the dialogue. My main concern is Derrida’s and Ricœur’s
plea to ground the founding principles of writing philosophically. On
this point, I contend that their readings of the  Phaedrus simplify the
philosophical  depth  of  Plato’s  discussion,  as  they  argue  Plato
attempted  to  determine  the  «status»  of  writing.  By  highlighting,
instead, the moral questions9 that arise in the dialogue in connection to
4 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 139.
5 PLATO 1953b [n.d.].
6 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 60-172.
7 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 71-3; RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 142-5.
8 The logically retrospective character of historical propositions/descriptions is vindicated
in DANTO, 1985 [1962], 152; and developed further in e.g. ROTH 2020, 7-10. The problem of
the narrative form and function of historiography is usually ascribed to WHITE 1973.
9 I use the term moral and not ethical throughout the text, for I speak of “moral agent”,
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various forms of writing, my two arguments are as follows. (1) Plato’s
claim is not to define the character of writing, but rather to reflect on
the  morality of what speaking, writing, and understanding honestly
involves. This invites a different phenomenology of writing than the
one  Derrida  and  Ricœur  undertake.  (2)  Derrida’s  and  Ricœur’s
tendency to put «the question of writing» in the form of the intrinsic
epistemic and moral «status» of writing as an invention or instrument,
overlooks the difficulties of dishonest writing that Plato’s discussion of
the pharmakon concerns. I contend that honest and dishonest inquiry is
not tied to the moral «status» of an invention or instrument, but to the
moral quality of what a human being does when inquiring.
With this argument, I break with Derrida’s and Ricœur’s vision of
writing. Instead of asking  what writing is (remedy or poison), I ask
what sense there is in raising a general question about writing being
either  remedy  of  poison.  Do  we  need  to  agree  with  Derrida  and
Ricœur that there is a question of writing that can be raised in general,
and that needs a general answer to serve as a condition of our idea of
historical and cultural knowledge? Again, this question should not be
understood as a general yes-or-no question; in terms of there being or
not being any problems in historical or cultural knowledge because of
its  written  character.  The  problem  I  deal  with  in  this  essay  arises
exactly when we start to think in such terms and start to answer the
question  generally,  as  if  it  had  a  given  answer  regardless  of  the
uniqueness of the particular cases we engage in and respond to. My
critique,  therefore,  concerns  a form of  reasoning that  still  occurs  in
historical,  cultural  and textual  theory today,10 which implies  that  it
would be possible and meaningful to entertain this question generally
and establish the answer as a general rule as to what historiography
“moral  judgment”,  and  “moral  understanding”.  Morals,  or  morality,  should  not  be
understood exclusively as mores, customs, or conventions here. It should be understood
as our attitude and relationship to other people, and the normativity that enters such
relationships. The attitude we have to other people, may be related to mores, but morality
cannot be reduced to what mores prescribe. COOK 1997, 130-8; MURDOCH 1997 [1957], 72-3.
10 A few recent examples of this tendency are, ERMARTH 2011, 35-9, 60-1, 92; MUNSLOW 2017,
480-1.
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(or indeed any kind of writing) unconditionally should predispose.
Before entering the discussion, some delineations are necessary. My
interest is Derrida’s and Ricœur’s framing of «the question of writing»
with regard to Plato’s Phaedrus,11 thus, my investigation is not a general
exegesis of their extensive work. Even if this investigation is a critique
of  one  particular  question  that  I  regard  as  troublesome  in  their
thinking, it does not imply a necessary disagreement with other claims
in their philosophical  oeuvre. It also does not disregard that, when it
comes to matters other than writing as pharmakon, Derrida and Ricœur
may have internally different visions.
2. «The Question of Writing» and Moral Agency
In order to understand how Derrida and Ricœur frame «the question
of  writing»,  then,  we must  first  consider  the myth of  the  origin of
writing in the dialogue.  It  is  from this  myth that  they mainly seek
justification for their arguments. What does the myth suggest? Near
the end of the  Phaedrus, after an extensive discussion of the force of
Eros in relation to the oral and written work of rhetoric, it is Socrates
who tells a mythic story of a charming elixir for the improvement of
memory:
Socrates: I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of
the ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is
called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth.
He it was who invented numbers and arithmetic and geometry
and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most important of
all, letters. Now the king of all Egypt at that time was the god
Thamus, who lived in the great city of the upper region, which
the Greeks call  the Egyptian Thebes,  and they call  the  god
himself Ammon. To him came Theuth to show his inventions,
11 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 69, 73-74. Ricœur uses the formulation «the invention of writing» to
indicate that writing is a problematic case that needs to be settled.  RICŒUR 2006 [2000],
138-143, 393.
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saying that they ought to be imparted to the other Egyptians.
But Thamus asked what use there was in each, and as Theuth
enumerated their uses, expressed praise or blame, according
as he approved or disapproved. The story goes that Thamus
said many things to Theuth in praise or blame of the various
arts,  which it  would take too long to repeat; but when they
came to the letters, ‘This invention, O king,’ said Theuth, ‘will
make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories;
for it is an elixir  [pharmakon] of memory and wisdom that I
have discovered.’
But Thamus replied, ‘Most ingenious Theuth, one man has
the  ability  to  beget  arts,  but  the  ability  to  judge  of  their
usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another;
and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by
your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that
which  they  really  possess.  For  this  invention  will  produce
forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because
they  will  not  practice  their  memory.  Their  trust  in  writing,
produced  by  external  characters  which  are  no  part  of
themselves,  will  discourage  the  use  of  their  own  memory
within them. You have invented an elixir  [pharmakon] not of
memory,  but  of  reminding;  and  you  offer  your  pupils  the
appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for  they will  read
many things without instruction and will  therefore seem to
know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant
and hard to get along with, since they are not wise, but only
appear wise.’12
Beginning with Derrida,  we must  reflect  on the mode in which he
understands this myth. In his reading, this myth is the main source of
what he calls «the trial of writing»; a trial of the necessary features of
the phenomenon or invention of writing.13 Thus, even if he claims that
the  «the  question  of  writing»  for  Plato  is  predominantly  one  of
12 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 274c-275b.
13 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 144.
Metodo Vol. 7, n. 2 (2019)
Is There a Problem of Writing in Historiography?                                       231
dialectics and morality, Derrida is not inquiring into what is involved in
being a good writer or reader. The trial is not a trial of a person or her
action, it is a trial of writing as such; a phenomenon or invention to
which  dialectics  and  morality  responds.  The  myth,  Derrida  says,
concerns the «status of writing» itself:14 
The truth of writing, that is,  as we shall see, (the) nontruth,
cannot be discovered in ourselves by ourselves. And it is not
an object of a science, only of a history that is recited, a fable
that is repeated. The link between writing and myth becomes
clearer,  as  does  its  opposition  to  knowledge,  notably  the
knowledge one seeks in oneself, by oneself. And at the same
time, through writing or though myth, the genealogical break
and the estrangement from the origin are sounded. One should
note most especially that what writing will  later be accused
of––repeating  without  knowing––here  defines  the  very
approach that leads to the statement and  determination of  its
status.  One  thus  begins  by  repeating  without  knowing––
through a myth––the  definition of writing, which is to repeat
without knowing. [my emphasis]15 
What does this perspective on «the question of writing» entail? In the
quote, Derrida speaks of writing in terms of the written word in itself
as an agent. It (writing in itself) – not the person writing or reading – is
«accused»  of  «repeating  without  knowing».16 Of  course,  even  for
Derrida, a phenomenon (in terms of invention or instrument) cannot
have the same type of agency as a human agent has, but he talks of
writing  as  behaving in  ways  not  connected  to  human  agency.
«Estranged» from its origin, writing lives, so to speak, its own life.17 
14 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 68-9, 73-5.
15 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 74-5.
16 This is evident from several formulations throughout «Plato’s Pharmacy». Cf. «it hides
from the first comer» (63), «before writing ever comes to leave its traces» (111), «breaking
with its origin» (148), «it is not of good birth» (148), etc.
17 For Derrida, writing is a logos of its own. DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 142-4; DERRIDA, 1982 [1972],
316; cf. BARTHES 1978 [1967], 142-3.
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This perspective on the instrumentality of writing is remarkable. To
replace  a  person’s  agency  with  the  agency  of  an  instrument  (or
invention),  will  affect  how we further  understand «the  question  of
writing». If «the truth of writing» is that «its status» as an instrument
is «repeating without knowing», how is this not to claim that writing
will behave in a repetitive way as an agent? We say that the instrument
(or invention, phenomenon) has this inherent «status», even a moral
«status» in terms of leading us astray and so causing us harm. 
In contrast, if the  person who writes is conceived to be the agent, it
dismisses the claim that writing in itself behaves in such and such a
way,  or  has  such and such a  «status»,  for  it  is  the  behavior  of  the
writer, or the context of understanding of the readers of the text, that
we  are  interested  in.  What  a  person  writes,  then,  may  well  be
«repeating without knowing»; he might simply memorize things and
write them down without understanding the meaning of them. Yet,
the  fact  that  he  is  memorizing  does  not  say  anything  about  the
«status» of writing in general, nor anything about the instrument or
technique he uses; «repeating without knowing» is rather the «status»
of that person’s action.
Thus, on this occasion, one could raise a set of questions about the
moral meaning of the way Derrida frames  «the question of writing».
What would it mean to «accuse» writing itself,  not the  person who
writes, of «repeating without knowing»? Is not a written word always
in the first place to be understood as the meaningful action of a human
agent, even though we do not necessarily know who it is? 
In  this  light,  Derrida’s  statement  about  writing  in  itself  causing
inauthentic repetition, externalizes moral agency by assigning it to an
impersonal  entity.  An  analogous  statement  to  this  would  be  if
someone hurt  another with  a bread-knife  and I  were to accuse the
knife of hurting people and not the person who used the knife. There,
it is clear that the bread-knife itself did not hurt people, neither did it
cause anyone to hurt people, nor was it designed for such purposes. If
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it hurt someone, someone used it in that way. Reproach belongs to that
person.  To «accuse»  writing in itself,  then,  seems misfocused from a
moral point of view, because it is only justified as long as one speaks of
writing as estranged from human agency.
Thus, the difficulty that an emphasis on moral agency actualizes is
not only the meaningfulness of morally questioning the instrumental
value of  writing,  but more importantly whether it  is meaningful  to
think  of  writing  in  such  instrumental  terms  at  all.  What  are  the
consequences of thinking of writing itself as  estranged from human
agency the way Derrida proposes? Jesper Svenbro, for example, argues
that the inscribed word as such never had  instrumental value for the
Ancient Greeks, but where rather dependent upon  someone speaking
them. When reading aloud, «This is the sēma of Archias», the reader’s
voice became the voice of the stele, of the inscriptor, or of the dead
person resting in the grave. The voice of the reader was no longer the
reader’s  own,  but  this  did  not  mean  the  inscription  bewitched  the
reader and used him to speak, or that it caused him to repeat what was
inscribed.  Instead,  the  reader  consciously  gave away his  voice  in  a
careful act of commemoration; he gave another his voice.18 
What Svenbro challenges, then, is Derrida’s idea that writing in itself
exists (as entity, agent, substance, structure, or instrument of inquiry)
independently  of  the  different  kinds of  human meaningful  actions
written words happen to be. It is, as Seth Benardete has argued, more
reasonable to understand writing as a moral deed that, as in the case
of  inscription,  shows  itself  in  our  lovingly  reading  and
understanding.19 Thus,  it  is  a  deed  that  is  part  of  human  moral
intercourse as much as speaking is.20 
Derrida  would  object  to  my  claims  here  by  arguing  that  «[t]he
disappearance of the Face» and «the structure of repetition» belong to
18 SVENBRO 1993 [1988], 3, 44-7; cf. SOURVINOU-INWOOD 1996, 160-2. For a similar idea in the
Egyptian New Kingdom, see LICHTHEIM 1976, 120.
19 BENARDETE 1999, 21; cf. PLATO, 1953b [n.d.], 228e, 242d-e, 277e.
20 Pace DERRIDA 1981  [1972],  77.  From  Wilhelm  Dilthey’s  critique  of  psychological
abstractions, one could also ask whether it is meaningful to hold a thesis where «written
words» are not anchored in human life. DILTHEY 1989 [1883], 82-3.
Metodo Vol. 7, n. 2 (2019)
234                                                                                               Natan Elgabsi
«generalized writing».21 This is to say that  the loss of  the empirical
presence  of  a  speaker,  and  the  loss  of  any  original  meanings  and
attendances of a written utterance, are inscribed in the very idea of
writing.22 However, one need not disagree with this phenomenological
insight about the empirical absence of the writer in order to question
the moral consequences that Derrida (and Ricœur) draw from it. Based
on  this  reading,  I  only  hope  to  have  brought  light  on  a  crucial
distinction with regard to agency in writing.
There is, namely, an important difference between conceiving, (a) the
person who writes,  or,  (b)  the written  word itself,  as  having moral
status (or agency). One’s emphasis affects what one can meaningfully
expect of a written word in moral terms. It affects, for instance,  who
(i.e. writing in itself or the person) we claim is responsible for a written
utterance, and what responsibility or duty we ourselves have in the
face of it.  It  is, for sure,  less challenging to «accuse» an impersonal
entity  (say,  a  linguistic/ideological  structure  or  an  instrument)  of
«repeating without knowing»,23 than saying the same thing to a person
to her face.24
If  we look to  Ricœur,  however,  he  first  gives  the  impression that
writing itself – the instrument – has nothing to do with the morality of
what  it  means  to  write.  Moral  agency  seems to  fall  on  the  human
doing the action: 
21 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 168, cf. 111. Cf.  SVENBRO 1993 [1988], 46-7.  For a moral defense of
Derrida see CRITCHLEY 1999, 44-5; BAUMAN 1995, 101-2. 
22 This is more strongly stated in DERRIDA 1982 [1972], 316-7; cf. RICŒUR 1981 [1970], 108.
23 It needs to be noted that Derrida’s accusation is directed toward historical or structural
meanings that our written words bring in. In his estimation, the written word gains its
meaning  from an  impersonal  «structure  of  repetition» that  hides  and  uses  tensions,
elements, and relationships historically existent in this very structure itself. DERRIDA 1997
[1967], 99;  DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 168;  DERRIDA 1982 [1972], 326; cf.  MURDOCH 2003 [1992],
188-9; MOI 2017, 71-2. The relevance of historical or structural meanings, hidden in our
writings and performances, is imperative to the idea of a «hermeneutics of suspicion».
SCOTT-BAUMANN 2009,  36-7;  cf.  SEDGWICK 2003,  125-7;  FELSKI 2015,  30-9. My  concern,
however, is where the thought that texts always express historico-structural meanings
would take us morally.
24 Cf. LÉVINAS 1979 [1961], 199; MURDOCH 2003 [1992], 193-5.
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The blame [in the  Phaedrus] does not fall on writing as such
but on the relation of the discourse to the just and unjust, the
bad and the good. It is with regard to this that the criterion
that discourses ‘written in the soul’ win out over all others and
why one must bid farewell to all these others. [my emphasis]25 
Despite this statement, and the further insight that the Phaedrus does
not  merely  concern  “epistemological”  but  also  “ethical”  matters,26
Ricœur  concurs  with  Derrida,  because  he  constantly  phrases  the
question about morality in writing as following:
[...]  what  fascinates  me,  as  it  does  Jacques  Derrida,  is  the
insurmountable  ambiguity  attached  to  the  pharmakon
[elixir/medicine/poison]  that  the  god  offers  the  king.  My
question: must we not ask whether the writing of history, too,
is remedy or poison?27 
Nevertheless, if we, as Ricœur does, ask whether historiography, too, is
either remedy or poison  due to its  written character,  we talk of  the
intrinsic  moral  status  of  «writing  as  such»,  as  an  invention  or
instrument. We ask whether the instrument itself is remedy or poison
(or has such an effect), not whether the utterance of a person may be
understood (or faultily actualized) in a potentially harmful way. If our
concern were actually what it means for a person to write in a morally
responsible way, we would not ask what the moral status of writing in
itself is. The instrument, I argue, will not affect the moral status of a
person’s action, any moral status that can be assigned to the written
word has this status in terms of  being a person’s action. Therefore, as
long as  Ricœur  puts  the  question  of  writing in  the  above  way,  his
endeavor will be, in Derrida’s terms, a «determination» of the «status»
of writing.
25 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 144.
26 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 144. 
27 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 141, cf. 139, 393, 499.
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My contention, so far, is that there are difficulties in Ricœur’s and
Derrida’s framing of «the question of writing» in the Phaedrus, because
they focus on the intrinsic (epistemic and moral) «status» of writing as
an  invention  or  instrument;  presuming,  then,  that  writing  may  be
regarded as «autonomous» or «estranged» either from its origin or its
addressee.28 The pharmakon, for Derrida and Ricœur, is not regarded as
an act  of  language,  but  as  a  toxin externally  implemented into  the
human mind, which justifies their speaking about writing in terms of
an invention being either  remedy or  poison for  memory.  However,
before we turn to the Phaedrus itself I must say something more about
what kind of intrinsic «status» they think writing has, and that in their
reading  is  substantiated  by  the  Phaedrus. Consider  what  Derrida
writes:
Contrary to life, writing––or, if you will, the  pharmakon––can
only displace or even aggravate the ill. Such will be, in its logical
outlines,  the  objections  the  king  raises  to  writing:  under
pretext  of  supplementing memory,  writing  makes  one  even
more forgetful; far from increasing knowledge, it diminishes it.
Writing does not answer the needs of memory, it aims to the
side, does not reinforce mnēmē [living memory/remembering],
but only hypomnēsis [reminding].29 
This  character  is  to  be  understood as  the  «status»  or  «the  truth  of
writing», or what writing in general is «accused» of in terms of being a
pharmakon and an agent on its own.30 But what results from writing
displacing and supplementing real  memory/wisdom is  occasionally
even  more  important.  For  Derrida  endorses  a  general  «suspicion»
toward writing that he contends Plato holds throughout the Phaedrus.31
This is, in my vision, Derrida’s most difficult remark about what the
28 «Semantic autonomy»,  RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 143,  166; «estrangement from the origin»,
DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 74, 137-8.
29 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 100.
30 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 73-4, 108-10.
31 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 167-9, cf. 76.
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«status» of writing must be:
Writing is no more valuable, says Plato, as a remedy than as a
poison. Even before Thamus has let fall his pejorative sentence,
the remedy is disturbing in itself. One must indeed be aware
of the fact that Plato is suspicious of the pharmakon in general,
even in the case of drugs used exclusively for therapeutic ends,
even when they are wielded with good intentions, and even
when they are as such effective. There is no such thing as a
harmless  remedy.  The  pharmakon can  never  be  simply
beneficial.32 
Suspicion may be imagined in at least three different ways here. For
instance, I can, as Lars Hertzberg says, ask whether I have sufficient
grounds for relying on something particular that someone has written.
In that case, I think I have «independent standards by which it is to be
judged whether or not my reliance on her [writing] was misplaced».
This case of suspicion would be analogous to how I am not relying on
a damaged instrument to do the thing I wish.33 
One could, however, even go as far as to imagine that I generally do
not trust a person, and thus I would not take her words seriously on
several matters. Every word she says would be «as though one were
drinking  from  a  contaminated  well»,  as  Simone  Weil  says.34 My
distrust of a person grows. Nevertheless, even if we imagine such a
case of serious distrust of another person, it does not mean that I have
come to distrust what people say or write in general. To judge whether
or not reliance on written words of others  generally is misplaced, is
hardly possible in terms of standards independent of the tacit trust in
each other’s words that we already presuppose in our everyday lives.35
There would, in Hertzberg’s words, be nothing that would  count as
32 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 99.
33 HERTZBERG 1994, 119-20. Quote from 119.
34 WEIL 2002 [1949], 35.
35 MURDOCH 2003 [1992], 214; cf. GADAMER, 1989 [1981], 55.
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evidence for or against Derrida’s sort of proposition.36 Judging that we
ought to suspect people’s written words for particular reasons, or that
we ought to rely on them for such and such reasons, are questions of
evidence. Suspicion as a  precondition, on the contrary, is something
else  entirely.  It  may  be  put  as  a  hypothetical  attempt  to  change  a
profound concept  of  trust  that  we  already  share  in  our  lives  with
others.  Suspicion,  then,  becomes  an  attitude to  the  words  of  other
people – a suspicious conviction or belief.37
Contrary to Derrida, however, Ricœur actually tries to refute what
may be called a «hermeneutics of suspicion» regarding text,38 but with
the result that he concurs with it.39 For, he says, in order for a true
historiography to be established:
[...] the suspicion would have to be exorcized that [the writing
of]  history  remains  a  hindrance  to  memory,  just  like  the
pharmakon of  the  myth,  where  in  the  end we do  not  know
whether it [writing] is a remedy or a poison, or both at once.
We shall have to allow this unavoidable suspicion to express
itself more than one time.40
There  is  one  problem  with  this  statement.  If  I  claim  that  an
«unavoidable suspicion» with regards to the writing of history must be
«exorcized»,  I  am  already  presupposing  and  integrating  general
36 HERTZBERG 1994, 121.
37 SEDGWICK 2003, 133-6; FELSKI 2015, 34-6.
38 Ricœur’s critique, here, is of Friedrich Nietzsche who reiterates the idea of the pharmakon
in the Phaedrus by reflecting on what history means for a contemporary society suffering
from a «malady of history».  NIETZSCHE, 1910 [1874], 94-7; cf.  RICŒUR 2006 [2006], 143-5,
287-92.
39 Ricœur sometimes talks about a hermeneutic task of reading text as having a «double
meaning»,  including  both  a  faithful  hermeneutic  restoration  of  intentions  and  a
suspicious reduction of illusions. This, however, implies that faith and suspicion are, in
principle, equally relevant in every interpretation of text. RICŒUR 2008 [1965], 32-3, 48.
See also  RICŒUR 1974 [1969], 62-4. Whether historiography is  remedy or poison is by
Ricœur regarded as a case of equivocality of meaning. Cf. RICŒUR, Memory, 287-90.
40 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 145.
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suspicion  into  the  idea  of  writing.41 This  statement,  so  to  speak,
already  embraces  the  necessity of  suspicion  as  a  precondition  of
writing. In that sense, Ricœur and Derrida speak the same language.
In  principle,  they  claim,  we  can  never  trust  any  written  word
wholeheartedly. And therefore, Ricœur concludes:
[T]he competition between memory and history, between the
faithfulness of the one and the truth of the other, cannot be
resolved  on  the  epistemological  plane.  In  this  respect,  the
suspicion  instilled  by  the  myth  of  the  Phaedrus—is  the
pharmakon of writing a poison or a remedy?—has never been
dispelled on the gnoseological plane.42 
I  want  to  ask  what  it  would  mean  to  say  that  suspicion  as  a
precondition of writing is «instilled» by the myth of writing – not as an
«epistemological» point but as a «gnoseological» one – and has «never
been dispelled»? First of  all,  the statement draws on faulty insights
from the Phaedrus, because Plato’s point, I will argue, was not to instill
a belief of unconditional suspicion toward people’s written words. His
concern was, on the contrary, to discuss what the morality of what we
say and do would involve, including the morality of our attitude to the
written and spoken words of others. Secondly, Ricœur’s statement (like
Derrida’s) shows a problematic attitude to other people as he thinks
we must, for reasons of  belief, allow (or presuppose) an «unavoidable
suspicion» with regard to people’s writings. 
What  worries  me,  therefore,  in  Derrida’s  and  Ricœur’s
«determination» of the «status» of writing, is not so much whether a
person is actually  capable of relating to the written words of others
with  a  suspicious  presumption,  but  where  such  a  belief in  an
«unavoidable suspicion», to any written words, takes us morally.
Let  us  take  an  example  of  where  this  moral  difficulty  surfaces.
Imagine that my friend writes me a letter about his mother who has
41 SCOTT-BAUMANN 2009, 158.
42 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 498-9.
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died recently. I did not know of her dying beforehand, I had not seen
her nor my friend for a while. The letter is an invitation to her burial.
After having read Plato’s Pharmacy, however, I have come to regard any
written word with unconditional suspicion. In one scenario, I believe
the letter is not from my friend at all, I regard it as a fraud and do not
respond to it. In another scenario, I do not doubt that the letter is from
my friend, but I think it is dubious whether my friend’s mother had
died  or  not.  In  a  third  scenario,  I  believe  that  my  friend’s  most
important message is not that his mother had died, and that we should
honor her together; instead I think the letter is a trick for testing my
response in such and such a situation. In these scenarios, expressing
three  different  suspicions,  I  do  not  distrust  something  like  ‘the
invitation itself’; I distrust another person’s words, with the outcome
that I seriously hurt my friend and other people involved if I have no
reason to distrust what he says.43 My not responding to my friend’s
invitation will surely come up the next time we meet again, given that
my  friend  is  still  my  friend  after  I  have  done  this  to  him.  To
epistemically question the truth claim of whether or not his mother
had died would also be difficult, for it would devalue what he says
regarding  a  very  serious  matter  in  his  life.  If  I  argue,  then,  that  I
assumed he mainly meant a different thing than inviting me to the
burial to honor his mother, it does not make the situation any better.
My  belief in  unconditional  suspicion  as  being,  with  Derrida,  the
«status» of any text would damage me morally. There is, of course, no
unconditional reason why I should suspect my friend’s invitation (or any
other text) in any of these ways.
3. The Myth of the Origin of Writing
If we turn to the Phaedrus now, I argue that there is no unconditional
«suspicion» toward writing being «instilled», because for Plato there is
43 Of course, my friend might be upset even though I have good reasons for putting what
he says into question.
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no question of determining the general «status» of writing. If there is a
general question, it is one about the  morality of inquiry. It is time to
look closer at the Phaedrus  in order to understand what is at stake in
the question of writing.
Let us recall the myth of the origin of writing. Even for the Greeks
400 BCE, the society of Egypt was an ancient and mythological one.44
The context of the story already implies that the event is carried out in
a time when it was expected to learn things by heart.45 This is true both
for  the  mythological  society  of  Thamus,  and  for  Plato’s  society.
Learning things by heart, however, involves a distinction imperative
for our understanding of the dialogue. There are two ways of learning
things  by  heart;  namely  learning  as,  (a)  repeating  and,  (b)
understanding.  To  learn  things  by  heart  as  a  matter  of  merely
reminding,  memorizing  or  repeating  something  without  really
understanding or knowing it,  is exactly the sort of hollow learning-
things-by-heart that king Thamus fears writing will bring.46 This is also
to  say that  the  king’s  fears  have little  to  do  with  the  technique  of
writing itself but rather concerns the attitude to one’s writing. In the
myth,  the  features  of  repeating,  memorizing,  or  forgetting  only
constitute the sort of impact that the king fears writing will have on our
memory. People may start to act sloppily as they learn how to write or
read. These features, however, are not inherent in writing as such. In
other words, it would be a mistake to say, with Derrida, that «in truth,
writing  is  essentially  bad,  external  to  memory,  productive  not  of
science but of belief, not of truth but of appearances. The  pharmakon
produces a play of appearances which enable it to pass for truth».47
Contrary to Derrida’s contention, I argue that the distinction involved
here is not one between the true and the written.48 It lies elsewhere.
If  Plato’s  distinction  between  the  true  (remembering)  and  the
44 Thamus is also known as Ammen-Re; the king of gods; the invisible god of life; the sun.
Teuth is the messenger god. WALLIS BUDGE 1904, 2-4.
45 SVENBRO 1993 [1988], 170.
46 Cf. GRISWOLD 1986, 206.
47 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 103.
48 DERRIDA, 1981 [1972], 68; cf. DERRIDA 1997 [1967], 34-7.
Metodo Vol. 7, n. 2 (2019)
242                                                                                               Natan Elgabsi
appearance  of  the  true  (memorizing/reminding),  is  not  necessarily
symmetrical with the practicing of one’s memory and writing things
down,  what kind of  distinction is  it?49 King Thamus says  to Teuth,
«this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who
learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory. […] You
have invented an elixir [pharmakon] not of memory, but of reminding;
and  you  offer  your  pupils  the  appearance  of  wisdom,  not  true
wisdom.»50 But  the  myth  itself  does  not  explain  the  distinction
between  remembering  and  reminding.  Rather,  it  presupposes  a
distinction which is already discussed by Socrates and Phaedrus uptil
the point where the myth is introduced. The distinction presupposed
is the human moral concern to «describe [show] the soul» of what he
does in an act of writing.51 Thus, one cannot say that the technique of
writing  is  intrinsically  bad,  immoral,  or  untruthful,  for  what  is  in
question is «those who learn to use it».52 At stake is the writers’ moral
responsibility in  their  acts of  writing.  In  that  sense,  Derrida  and
Ricœur  are  right  in  saying  that  the  dialogue  concerns  moral
questions.53 But it is not the general moral «status» of the instrument or
technique of writing that Plato talks about.54 His concern is what an
honest person should and should not do when inquiring.
This  dimension –  an inquiry  into  the  moral  quality  of  a person’s
action – shimmers throughout the myth. King Thamus says to Teuth,
«one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their
usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another [man]».55
This implies that the meaning of an act of persuasion, and a moral
judgement  of  that  action,  together  belong  to  our  understanding  of
what  an  action  morally  means.  Persuasion,  however,  risks  being
misunderstood if not related to a Platonic vision of morality and artful
49 Cf. DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 91.
50 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 275a.
51 I henceforth translate  akribeia  as to «show», instead of to «describe».  PLATO 1953b [n.d],
271a.
52 Cf. PLATO 1989 [n.d.], 341a-d.
53 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 68, 74; Ricœur 2006 [2000], 144; cf. Plato 1953b [n.d.], 258d, 274b.
54 Pace DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 68, 77; Ricœur 2006 [2000], 139, 141, 499.
55 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 274e.
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performance. For Plato, the one who performs something «with real
art» has a responsibility, above all, to «show the soul» of what he is
doing, or claiming to have knowledge about.56 Or rather, to perform
something  «with  real  art»  already  means  that  the  artist  actually
«shows the soul» of his subject, and this is not only his own judgement
but is judged beyond what he himself claims or thinks he does. «[T]o
beget arts», or to do something «with real art», then, means that it is
not  up to me, as a speaker or writer,  to  decide or  judge what is the
meaning of my own action.57 By contrast,  my moral task lies in the
duty to «show the soul» of what is at stake; for I who claim to speak
and  write  truthfully  should,  of  course,  always  be  guided  by  the
concern to make sure that that is what I do.58 One could say that my
honesty and responsibility is the concern to «show the soul» of what I
claim and do.
In this context, Thamus says something more. To evaluate whether
someone in his act of persuasion «shows the soul» or not cannot solely
be a responsibility put on the one who tries to persuade people. Other
people have a responsibility as well to judge what an act of persuasion
morally  means.  This  judgement,  Plato  argues,  is  a  matter  of
«understand[ing] the nature of the soul»;59 the nature of what has been
said.  Let  us  consider  a  strong  example  form  the  myth.  Teuth,  the
messenger, having done his best to «show the soul» of what written
words may bring, is not,  as it  were,  in the position to contend that
these words  actually  will  be  an «elixir  [pharmakon]  of  memory and
wisdom».60 Thamus the king, who is the god of life,61 on the contrary,
is in the position to judge such matters, as he  is afraid written words
will  bring  mere  appearances  of  wisdom  and  forgetfulness  to  his
people.62
56 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 271a-c, 277c.
57 Cf. KRONQVIST 2019, 983.
58 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 262b, 277c-d.
59 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 277b-c.
60 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 274e.
61 WALLIS BUDGE 1904, 2-4.
62 The criticism of writing in this myth may be an implicit criticism of any craft (technē).
GRISWOLD 1986, 204-5.
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Is the myth then, as Derrida and Ricœur would have it, a «trial» of
the  invention of writing, and thus about the  intrinsic «status» of this
invention?63 I think we have to leave this idea behind.64 It would be a
simplification of the matters involved in the myth to say that Plato’s
distinction is  between the  true  and the written.65 For the demand to
show  and  see  what  the  written  words  of  others  mean  –  the
truthfulness  when  writing,  as  well  as  the  truthfulness  in
understanding what is being said – is a demand that is constantly put
on  us  as  moral  agents.  The  Platonic  difficulties  of  writing,  on this
reading, are not put as matters of inquiring into what true epistemic
content an instrument generally communicates.66 The myth does not
explain  that  the  written  word  in  general  must  be  regarded  as  an
indeterminate  pharmakon,  nor  does  it  explain  that  writing  must  be
approached with  unconditional  suspicion.  It  is,  I  argue,  a  different
type of distinction that Plato makes throughout the dialogue; one that
is not inherent in any specific technique or craft but may instead be
put  as  our  responsibility  as craftsmen,  performers,  rhetors,  fellow
human beings, to honestly show what we do and speak of. 
4. To Guide the Stranger to a Good Place
Let us now set aside the question about the general «status» of writing,
and look at different examples of writing that surface in the Phaedrus.
We have already looked at one, the myth of the origin of writing. But
the most striking question about writing arises in the beginning of the
dialogue, as an analogy to what is involved in guiding a stranger in to
«a good place».67 This analogy concerns the manner in which we guide
or follow each other, as well as the places to where we are taking each
63 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 144; RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 141-2.
64 The idea that the Phaedrus shows the general problem of writing seems to be a common
philosophical reading – VAN DER HEIDEN 2010, 58-63.
65 Pace DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 68; see MURDOCH 2003 [1992], 18-9, 23.
66 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 274b.
67 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 229a.
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other in conversation or in life.68 It  is, one could say, this important
moral mode in which Socrates’  and Phaedrus’ later concerns in the
dialogue regarding the charm of written and oral rhetoric are situated.
Phaedrus, the story goes, had for once dragged out Socrates from his
comfortable city-milieu to the countryside, which was unfamiliar to
him:
Phaedrus. You are an amazing and most remarkable person.
For you really do seem exactly like a stranger who is being
guided about, and not like a native. You don’t go away from
the city out over the border, and it seems to me you don’t go
outside the walls at all.
Socrates. Forgive me, my dear friend. You see, I am fond of
learning. Now the country places and the trees won’t teach me
anything, and the people in the city do. But you seem to have
found the charm [pharmakon] to bring me out. For as people
lead hungry animals by shaking in front of them a branch of
leaves or some fruit, just so, I think, you, by holding before me
discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica and whenever
else you please. So now that I have come here, I intend to lie
down, and do you choose the position in which you think you
can read most easily, and read.69 
I want to suggest that this conversation shows Socrates’ and Phaedrus’
relationship  of  friendship  or  love.  In  their  conversation,  Eros is
involved the  pharmakon, in the form of desire for being with the one
you love, or of admiration of what the other says. Socrates is charmed
by Phaedrus and says, «I am so determined to hear you, that I will not
leave you, even if you extend the walk to Megara,  and, as Herodicus
says, go to the wall and back again».70 This describes very well how
one trusts another person and goes along; how one can be seduced by
68 Cf. KRONQVIST 2019, 983-4.
69 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 230d-e.
70 PLATO 1953b [n.d.],  227d. The distance between Athens and the walls of  Megara was
about 40 kilometers. KOTWICK 2016, 144.
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another  person,  or  even  does  stupid  things  when  blinded  by
admiration. It shows how  written and  oral words may affect people,
and puts different responsibilities on people depending on the place
they have in relation to each other.71
We can recognize what enters Socrates’ and Phaedrus’ relationship.
We  have  experienced  it  before,  in  our  lives.  By  telling  me  certain
things, you may take me to places that I am not familiar with where I
feel I do not belong. In a material way or in conversation, you may take
me to places that you as a teller must know better than me for you say
you have been there before and you guide me. In trusting you, my
state of mind might be, «now that I have come here, I intend to lie
down». Matters are, so to speak, in your hands. Trusting you means
that I am open for your suggestions, I let you guide me. I trust that you
will lead us in the right direction, to «a good place», for I do not know
where  we  are  going,  only  where  you  say we  are  going.72 Heading
toward the place you want to show me, I might see something I did
not see before. I might, as Socrates occasionally does, come to see how
beautiful the place to which you have led me really is. «By Hera», says
Socrates, «it is a charming resting place».73 I might come to see why
you wanted to take me there in the first place. I might appreciate this
place, and the things you said, in a way I could not imagine before.
You drag me out from my convenience, from my «city walls», from the
place I know and do not want to leave, my prejudices. But since you
tell me you will guide me to this place and no other, it is also your
responsibility to do so.
Exactly as Socrates leaves himself in the hands of Phaedrus, I leave
myself in your hands when you tell me something. I trust that you will
lead me to «a good place», I have no reason to distrust you, you are my
friend. Thus, the story illustrates a crucial moral demand regarding
what it means to inquire truthfully. Phaedrus has a responsibility in this
relationship. It is Phaedrus who introduces this new milieu, in which
71 Cf. BENARDETE 1999, 21.
72 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 229a-b.
73 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 230b.
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Socrates indeed is a stranger. It is Phaedrus who carries Socrates in his
arms,74 and must now be prepared to take responsibility for him; must,
as  it  were,  guide him toward «a  good place».  This  feature  in  their
relationship, to carry someone else in one’s arms, is, then, a demand
on Phaedrus.  Phaedrus have Socrates  seduced,  and could lead him
astray, «all over Attica and whenever else you please», and had the
possibility to do so. But to lead Socrates astray intentionally or due to
ignorance would put  their  friendship into  question,  would damage
them both in different ways. It is not something Phaedrus as a friend
could do to  Socrates.  Socrates  will  eventually  ask where  they have
ended up. ‘Is this the beautiful place you said you would lead me to?’
He could say he still does not see the promised beauty or goodness of
the place. Or even worse, that the place is darker than he thought it
would  be.  In  the  dialogue,  however,  Socrates  admires  the  place  to
which Phaedrus has led him, when he opens his eyes and sees what
this place really is. He admires the grass, the cicadas, the breeze, the
water, as he eventually says, «So you have guided the stranger most
excellently, dear Phaedrus.»75 
To «guide the stranger» in this way, to try to lead him to «a good
place», is, I believe, an analogy for the moral matters that enter telling
or writing something honestly. The seducing powers of the pharmakon
is here a matter of taking responsibility for another person, as he/she
trusts you, when you take that person on a journey. It would, however,
be  wrong  to  say  that  «guiding  the  stranger»  to  «a  good  place»  is
peculiarly tied to one specific art or technique. Likewise, it would be
wrong to  say that  the  written  word has  no capacity  to  «guide the
stranger». «Guiding the stranger» is here illustrated as a moral matter
of being truthful and honest toward people involved in the things one
does.  And  it  is,  of  course,  something  that  a  person does.  In  more
Platonic  terms,  the  metaphor  or  concept  is  a  matter  of  leading
someone in light of the good; be it in speech, in writing, or in life. In
other words, to show, to the best of one’s abilities, the soul or nature of
74 Cf. LØGSTRUP 1997 [1956], 17-8.
75 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 230d.
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what one claims. 
This lack of honesty is, Socrates says, the problem with rhetoric, as
some rhetors do not  show the soul of what they contend to hold in
their  hands,  although  they  claim  to  speak  «with  art»  about  their
matters. For, he says, «Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an art which
leads the soul by means of words, not only in law court and in the
various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well?»
«Do  they  not  contend  in  speech,  or  what  shall  we  say  they  do?»
«About the just and the unjust?»76 Rhetoric is, then, an art of guiding
the soul – guiding other people – which means that the moral demand
of guiding someone in the right direction is present at all times as a
responsibility of the rhetor. Whether the rhetor guides the stranger in
the light of the good, in writing or in speech, is the moral concern
Plato has throughout the dialogue. And this concern is, I think, not so
much a question of writing as such, as it is a matter of truthful inquiry
in general:
Socrates: The method of the art of healing is much the same as
that of rhetoric.
Phaedrus: How so?
Sorcrates: In both cases you must analyse nature, in one that
of the body and in the other that  of the soul,  if  you are to
proceed  in  a  scientific  manner,  not  merely  by  practice  and
routine,  to  impart  health  and  strength  to  the  body  by
prescribing  medicine  [pharmaka]  and  diet,  or  by  proper
discourses and training to give to the soul the desired belief
and virtue.
[...]
Socrates: Then see what Hippocrates and true reason says
about nature. In considering the nature of anything, must we
not consider first, whether that in respect to which we wish to
be learned ourselves and to make others learned is simple or
multiform,  and then,  if  it  is  simple,  enquire  what  power of
acting it possesses, or of being acted upon, and by what, and if
76 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 261a-c.
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it has many forms, number them, and then see in the case of
each form, as we did in the case of the simple nature, what its
action is and how it is acted upon and by what?
Phaedrus: Very likely, Socrates.
Socrates: At any rate, any other mode of procedure would be
like the progress of a blind man. Yet surely he who pursues
any study scientifically ought not to become comparable to a
blind or a deaf man, but evidently the man whose rhetorical
teaching is a real art will explain accurately the nature of that
to which his words are to be addressed, and that is the soul, is
it not?77 
The analogy between medicine and rhetoric is not a coincidence; it is
vital to the discussion. On the one hand, the practitioners of these arts
give  the  body and the  soul  the  food it  needs,  both  physically  and
morally. Medicine concerns what is good for the human body, while
rhetoric  concerns  what  is  good  for  human  mind  and  moral  life
together. These arts are necessities for human wellbeing, in terms of
human care, first of all for each other. The medic seldom heals his own
wounds,  the  rhetor  does  not  speaks  to  himself.  It  belongs  to  their
respective practices that they care for what is good for the body and
the  soul  of  other  people.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  capacity  to
nourish the body or the soul that should be investigated if one wants
to understand what a practice means – the «nature» of it.78 And in
order to understand what the «nature» of something is, the one who
proceeds scientifically or artfully must first show whether the «nature»
of the matter under scrutiny is «simple or multiform». His purpose
must, as Socrates says, be to show «what its action is and how it is
acted upon and by what?» Particular medicines (pharmaka) can have
certain  harmful  effects  on  the  human  body,  exactly  as  rhetorical
arguments may damage a soul or put someone in danger. Therefore, to
show what something is, and what it means in what circumstances,
belongs to honestly showing the «nature» of the matter at hand.
77 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 270c-e.
78 IRWIN 1995, 322-3.
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It is important to note that the instrumental value of writing (which I
previously  criticized Derrida  and Ricœur for  characterizing as  «the
question of writing») is not in question.79 Writing is not even regarded
as an instrument, but belongs, in this case, to the craft of rhetoric, and
is meaningful in terms of being the rhetor’s inquiry. What Socrates and
Phaedrus discuss  is  the  moral  quality  of  what the rhetor writes;  to
what extent he cares for the souls of others in his written and oral
work. And so, they conclude, «By no other method of exposition or
speech will this [speeches and handbooks about the art of rhetoric], or
anything else, ever be written or spoken with real art. But those whom
you have heard, who write treatises on the art of speech nowadays, are
deceivers and conceal the nature of the soul, though they know it very
well.»80 The crucial point is that the rhetor «conceal[s] the nature of the
soul» and is dishonest not  because he writes, but because he does not
follow the  philosophical  «method»  of  showing what  is  involved  in
honest speaking and writing although «he know[s] it very well». In
that sense, the rhetor is not honest in what he does.
Yet, this is also how they philosophically scrutinize the «nature» of
any kind of inquiry (written or oral such). Namely, by illustrating that
the fundamental moral quality of any inquiry surfaces in the question
whether we actually show the «nature» of what we do and talk about.
And if not, whether we simply ignore it, whether we deceive people
on purpose, or whether we do not know what we talk about at all.
5. Reproach and the Divinity of Writing
So far,  I  have argued that  inquiry as  pharmakon refers  to  a person’s
responsibility of being honest; his responsibility of, so to speak, giving
other souls proper nutrition (parmaka)  or care,  by showing what he
writes  or  speaks  of.  Simultaneously  this  involves  a  question  of
conscience, of giving one’s own soul proper nutrition as well, by not
79 Cf. SVENBRO 1993 [1988], 212.
80 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 271b-c.
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feeding on the lie that I have helped another or been truthful about
what I do when I know I have not.81 A stranger could be led astray, a
soul  might  be  damaged,  if  we  are  reckless  with  words.  It  would,
however,  be a mistake to say that  we are in principle reckless with
words, or that the pharmakon generally must involve such possibilities.
Plato is not interested in deciding on such questions, in fact he already
says on what occasions a rhetor is reckless, namely, when a rhetor does
not «show the soul» of what is at hand. On such occasions, his words
are poison. 
I  must  now turn to a  different  aspect  of  the written word in the
Phaedrus, which has hitherto surfaced only briefly in the myth of the
origin of writing. This is what one could call the divinity of writing. In
other words,  what in the myth of the origin of  writing was put as
writing  as  an  eternal  gift  from  the  gods  that  is  irreproachable  in
character, evaluated only by the god of life. We must keep in mind,
however,  that  divinity  is  tied not  to  all,  but  to  one specific  type of
writing in this dialogue. It is associated with logography, the writing of
laws.  In  this  context,  Socrates  ironically  says,  «the  proudest  of  the
statesmen are most fond of  writing and of leaving writings  behind
them, since they care so much of praise that when they write a speech
add at  the beginning the  names of  those who praise  them in each
instance.»82 This  desire  for  praise,  or  divinity,  is  a  dimension  of
rhetorical work that calls for more analysis. 
Socrates critique is of the desire of leaving things behind – or of, as it
were, making oneself  eternal, immortal, or  divine.83 If this becomes the
speech-writes’ interest, people, including the rhetor himself,  tend to
forget both who he is, and what his duty is. The rhetor forgets that he
is no god. His duty as a rhetor is always to «show the soul» of what he
does and describes. In other words, his duty was to show other people
that  he is  a  person and no god,  and that  he never  wrote anything
81 On the importance of self-knowledge in Plato see BENARDETE 1999, 53-5; GRISWOLD 1986,
223.  In  Plato’s  dialogues,  epistemic  and  moral  questions  are  usually  related  to  self-
knowledge. STRANDBERG 2015, 6, 10-2.
82 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 257d-e.
83 Cf. SVENBRO 1993 [1988], 48. PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 257d-258c.
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divine.  Speeches  are,  Socrates  implies,  written  not  by  gods  but  by
mortals,  and  should  be  reproached  accordingly.  In  this  regard,  he
opens what I see as one of the most important aspect of this dialogue
by saying: 
Well  then,  when  an  orator  or  a  king  is  able  to  rival  the
greatness  of  Lycurgus  or  Solon  or  Darius  and  attain
immortality as a writer of the state [logographos], does he not
while living think of himself equal to the gods, and has not
posterity the same opinion of him, when they see his writings
[grammata]?84 
In a slightly different way than Derrida, who argues that the absent
writer manifests himself in logography, I think this persistent critique
must not be understood as a critique of the writing of law per se,85 but
rather as a critique of one particular tendency in rethoric –one kind of
attitude that we tend to have to written words.
In the quote, we miss a crucial point of the argument if we do not
consider that Lycurgus of Sparta, Solon of Athens, Darius of Persia all
were legendary lawgivers, whose writings, legacies, and reputations
were on the verge of  divine. What this means for Socrates’ critique is
utterly  important.  Plutarch,  for  instance,  describes  Lycurgus  as
«beloved  of  the  gods,  and  rather  god  than  man»;86 after  Lycurgus,
according to the legend, had consulted the Oracle of Delphi, after the
gods had promised him «a constitution which should be the best in
the world».87 This constitution was then the law of Sparta, the rules
that  maintained  a  whole  way  of  life.  It  is,  of  course,  this divine
character that Socrates fears ordinary rhetoric and speech-writing may
gain, or ascribe to itself, as a consequence of dishonest writing – of
thinking of oneself as god and not as human. It is not at all to say that
there  is  no  difference  between  Lycurgus’  lawgiving  and  ordinary
84 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 258c.
85 Pace DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 68.
86 PLUTARCH 1967 [n.d.], 216.
87 PLUTARCH 1967 [n.d.], 219.
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rhetoric, just that an honest rhetor shows this difference, shows that he
is no god, while a dishonest does not.
The status of writing itself is not at stake here. At stake is rather the
concern  to  be  honest  when writing.  There  are  different  types  of
writing, and it belongs to a honest person both to show how discourse
are  different,  if  it  is  something  he  himself  claims,  and to  see  their
differing moral values, if it is something he tries to understand. The
rhetor pretending to be a god is a typical example of dishonest action.
That rhetor is, Socrates says, «buying honour among men by sinning
against the gods.»88 But it is not only the rhetor playing god who is a
sinner, for Socrates, too, calls himself a sinner as he actually believed
the dishonest rhetor who played god.89 
«Sinning against the gods» is a metaphor for dishonesty; a metaphor
of speaking ill of  Eros as a god, as  Lysias did when he claimed that
love has a harmful side.90 But Socrates’ concern is not to inquire into
whether  to  think  of  Eros as  a  god  or  not,  but  rather  to  show that
neither Lysias nor Socrates himself in their respective speeches about
love did «show the soul» of what they spoke of when they claimed
that  Eros was  evil.  Thus,  Lysias’  and  Socrates’  speeches  were  not
expressions of love as they used  Eros as an inspiration for speaking
from a selfish place in themselves. For, Socrates says about Lysias’ and
his own speech, «while they were saying nothing sound or true, they
put on airs as if they amounted to something, if they could cheat some
mere manikins and gain honour among them.»91 They did not honestly
show what they spoke of. But sinning falls back on Socrates himself in
yet another sense. For he not only used Eros to speak from a place of
self-interest, but also conceived Lysias’ rhetorical work (as well as his
own) as being spoken in light of the good, as being expressions of love,
when they were not.
This sinning, then, illuminates a moral failure in myself as I do not
care for  showing or understanding what the particular  discourse  at
88 This is Ibycus proverb. PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 242d.
89 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 242d-243c.
90 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 242d-e.
91 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 242e-243a.
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hand means. The sinning Socrates speaks of would enter when I, for
example, consider the inquiry at stake to be play, when it is serious
reality, or vice versa.92 It is, in other words, an attitude to other people,
and conscientious moral judgment in a life with other people, that is
the true moral concern Socrates has. Even in cases of Lysias’ acclaimed
rhetorical work, «ignorance of right and wrong and good and bad is in
truth  inevitably  a  disgrace,  even  if  the  whole  mob applaud it  [his
speech].»93 Sinning concerns the listener as much as it concerns the
speaker. To see what something is in what situation, or what is wrong
with it, is as much my responsibility as it is yours.
So,  Socrates  says  to  Phaedrus,  «Now  I,  my  friend,  must  purify
myself»,  for this  belongs to the conscience of  trying to be a honest
person.94 The  ritual  of  purification  (katharmos)  in  this  religious
framework  means  he  must  deny the  very  qualities  of  a  claim.
Purification  consists  of  recognizing  what  his  sin  toward  another
person was; in this case, that Lysias’ written speech about love that
Phaedrus read to him was not a speech about love at all, but just gave
him  that  impression.  Only  then,  after  purification,  could  Socrates
regain his sight.95 But it would be a mistake to say that purification is
skepticism, or that it is blaming a scapegoat (pharmakos) in order to
deal with my own sins,96 for at stake is rather my own repentance or
grief. To «purify myself» is a matter of me trying to see clearly, of me
recognizing what my disgrace toward another person consisted in, as I
look again to whom that other person was and what she said, as I see
my injustice toward her.97 
One could say, then, that Socrates reproach of Lysias’ written speech,
92 Cf. PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 276d-e.
93 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 277e.
94 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 243a.
95 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 243a-b.
96 For a link between the purification rite of katharmos, and the scapegoating of a pharmakos
see:  BURKERT 2012  [1977], 82-4. Sacrifice of animals in the Judaic temple-cult bears on
similar  ideas  as  the  pharmakos-katharmos; and  is  important  in  Christian  theology
describing  Jesus  metaphorically  as  a  «lamb of  God» sacrificed  to  purify  the  sins  of
humanity. GIRARD 2001 [1999], 51-2, 77-8, 153-6.
97 Cf. MURDOCH 1997 [1964], 313.
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and Socrates repentance when neglecting the «soul» of it, is a matter of
deepening one’s  «moral  understanding».98 It  portrays,  Iris  Murdoch
says, «a change of self-being» that «informs the moral quality of the
world»; namely a fundamental change of the relationship we come to
have to others.99 It is not so much a question of blame, or of thinking
that there is a right answer to a moral issue,100 as it is a matter of my
close moral attention to the meaning of my own and other person’s
deeds.101 This plea for attention, then, shows my responsibly in seeing
what kind of utterance something is, namely what origin («father»), or
character («soul») an utterance has.102 Thus, when Plato claims that the
written word «needs its father to help it» when «ill-treated or unjustly
relieved»,103 he  has  in  mind a  conscientious  attitude  to  the  written
words  of  other  people.  His  concern  is  the  moral  quality  of  my
responsiveness.
This attentiveness to other persons that Plato is calling for, however,
tends to be lost in Derrida’s and Ricœur’s reading of the Phaedrus due
to  their  focus  on  the  generally  suspicious  «status»  that  writing  is
presumed to have. Derrida writes:
The status of this orphan [written logos], whose welfare cannot
be assured by any attendance or assistance, coincides with that
of  a  graphein which,  being  nobody’s  son  at  the  instant  it
reaches inscription, scarcely remains a son at all and no longer
recognizes its origins, whether legally or morally. [...]
The  Phaedrus  would already be sufficient to prove that the
responsibility  for  logos,  for  its  meaning  and effects,  goes  to
those who attend it [written  logos], to those who are present
with  the  presence  of  a  father.  These  ‘metaphors’  must  be
98 GAITA 1989, 133-5.
99 MURDOCH 2003 [1992], 177.
100 IRWIN 1995, 164.
101 GAITA 1989,  135,  147;  cf.  GRISWOLD 1986,  223.  Elsewhere  Plato  speaks  directly  of
philosophy  as  being  a  process  of  katharmos;  a  task,  one  could  say,  of  moral
understanding, or change of self-being. PLATO 1953a [n.d.], 67a-d, 82d.
102 Cf. LARSON 2009, 82-3.
103 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 275e.
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tirelessly questioned.104 
This  may  be  considered  in  relation  to  a  typically  hermeneutic
utterance by Ricœur:
The  case  [of  writing]  turns  out  to  be  even  more  damning:
written down once and for  all,  the  discourse  is  in  quest  of
some interlocutor, whoever it may be––one does not know to
whom it is addressed. This is also the case for the historical
narrative that gets written and published: it is tossed to the
winds,  it  is  addressed,  as Gadamer  says of  Schriftlichkeit,  to
whomever knows how to read. [...] This is certainly the  case
for a history book,  as for any book. It  has cut  its  ties to its
speaker.105 
Contrary  to  these  persistent  (and  no  doubt  very  absolute)
«determinations» of the «status» of writing, I would argue that Plato is
afraid that  we  no  longer  recognize  the  origin  and  character  of  a
person’s  written  utterance  «legally  or  morally»;106 but  he  does  not
contend that this is necessarily the case.107 He is, for sure, afraid that a
written word may «cut its ties to its speaker» and so may be «tossed to
the  winds»  because  of  our  immorality;  our  incapacity  of
understanding  how  we  should  properly  respond  to  it.  But  I  have
argued that  exactly  this  problem,  which Plato  discusses,  is  a  moral
difficulty in  our  relationship  with  other  people;  a  difficulty  of
conscientiously trying to be just to the word of others by reflecting and
104 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 77-8.
105 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 142-3. This exact statement is also found in RICŒUR 1981a [1971], 164;
cf. GADAMER 2006 [1960], 153–4. Gadamer writes: «Literature, the written word, seems to
be poetry alienated from its ontological valence. It could be said of every book – not just
the famous one that makes this claim – that it is for everyone and no one.» (153).
106 This may be related to the debate raised around W.K. Wimsatt’s and M.C. Beardsley’s
article  «The  Intentional  Fallacy»  from  1946.  The  debate  is  reprinted  as  On  Literary
Intention, NEWTON-DE MOLINA 1976; cf. BARTHES 1978 [1967], 144-8.
107 Jesper Svenbro argues, «At no point in Plato’s work is writing ‘parricide,’  as Derrida
would have it.» SVENBRO 1993  [1988],  213; cf. GRISWOLD 1986, 234-5.  Pace  DERRIDA 1981
[1972], 143-8; Pace VAN DER HEIDEN 2010, 62-5.
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«speak[ing] of propriety and impropriety in writing, how it should be
done and how it is improper».108 The moral difficulty of conscience,
attention,  reproach,  with  regard  to  what  other  people  do,  is  not  a
question of settling the principal conditions,  and moral qualities, of
any written words with sentences such as «at the instant it [a word]
reaches inscription,  [...]  [it]  no longer  recognizes its  origins,  whether
legally  or  morally». By  contrast,  in  Plato’s  estimation,  we  cannot
determine what a written word morally means without inquiring into
the particular matters at hand. Only then can we say of a particular
case  whether  Derrida’s  and  Ricouer’s  statements  here  would  be
sufficient  or  whether  the  statements  would  mark  an  ignorance
(perhaps even show a moral failure) in ourselves.109
The problem with Derrida’s and Ricœur’s general statements about
the presumed suspicious and alienating «status» of writing is that it
may permit me to think that we can overlook written words as actually
being  the  moral  actions  of  other  humans. In  that  sense,  it  may
disregard  our  necessity of  deepening  our  moral  understanding  of
what  kind of  personal  moral  actions  we  respond  to.  This  kind  of
evasion was, of course, not at all what Plato had in mind; instead he
condemned such an approach to another person’s words as «ill-treated
or unjustly relieved».110 In theory we may think that a text is written
for «whomever» (as Ricœur’s hermeneutics entails),111 or that morality
in reading is not our relationship with the words of another person, but
our  personal  relationship  with  «a  text  itself»  (as  Derrida’s
deconstruction entails).112 But for Plato, such statements already show
108 PLATO 1953b [n.d.], 274b.
109 In  his  discussion  of  technical  and  moral  knowledge,  Gadamer  emphasizes,  I  think
rightly,  that  the  problem  of  hermeneutic  method  itself  bears  on  moral  questions  of
various character. GADAMER 2006 [1960], 310-21.
110 PLATO 1953b  [n.d.],  275e.  Pace DERRIDA 1981  [1972],  77-8;  DERRIDA 1982  [1972],  316;
BAUMAN 1995, 102.
111 Given the alienating status  that  Ricœur  (in  a manner similar  to Derrida)  ascribes  to
writing in general, in e.g. ‘‘What is a Text?,’’  1981b [1970], 108-10, ‘‘The Model of the
Text,’’ 1981a [1971], 160-4, and Memory, History, Forgetting 2006 [2000], 142-3, he tends to
contradict his own question of conscientiousness that he proposes in ‘‘The Self  as an
Ethical Aim,’’ 1994 [1990], 180-1.
112 DERRIDA 1988, 138; CRITCHLEY 1999, 44; cf.  HILLIS MILLER 1987, 181-91. John D. Caputo
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a «disgrace» (or immorality) in how we respond to the demand that
other people put on us, as we in our life already have a responsibility
to conscientiously care for the «soul» of others in any kind of human
intercourse.113 In the  Phaedrus, this is not a juridical or conventional
demand set up by social rules, but a caring for other persons as I plant
something in «the garden of letters»,114 or as I try to understand the
nature of the words that have been planted there before me.
6. Writing as a Condition of Historiography
In  this  investigation  I  have  criticized  what  Derrida  and  Ricœur
presented  as  «the  question  of  writing»  in  Plato’s  Phaedrus.  My
argument  was  that  Plato’s  concern  is  not,  as  Derrida  and  Ricœur
contend, the «determination» of the (epistemic or moral) «status» of
writing as an instrument, but the moral quality of what a person says or
writes.  The  metaphor  of  guiding  a  stranger  to  the  right  place,  for
example, refers to my responsibility in being honest in what I write.
The metaphor of sinning against the gods and purification from this
sin, on the contrary, refers to me having to repent for being dishonest
in  my  pretention  to  write  honestly,  or  my  ignorance  of  the  true
character of the words of the other person I respond to. The dialogue, I
have  argued,  shows  various  moral  questions  that  enters  our
relationship with other persons in cases of written inquiry.
With  this  discussion,  I  have  tried  to  break  with  Derrida’s  and
Ricœur’s vision of writing, even discuss aspects of their vision that are
morally questionable. When Derrida argues that the written word «no
longer recognizes its origins, whether legally or morally»,115 and Ricœur
argues  that  «in  the  end  we do  not  know  whether  it  [writing]  is  a
argues that Derrida’s intention was to end with the hermeneutic sender-receiver «postal
principle» and put «Hermes out of a job». CAPUTO 1987, 153–4, 160.
113 Cf. LÉVINAS 1979 [1961], 201; LØGSTRUP 1997 [1956], 44-6.
114 PLATO 1953 [n.d.], 276d.
115 DERRIDA 1981 [1972], 77.
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remedy or a poison»,116 the written word in  itself is characterized as
«legally or morally» irresponsible or harmful. The confusion, however,
is that writing as an instrument (like the bread-knife) is not a moral
agent  that  behaves  in  suspicious  ways,  for  the  written  word  is
meaningful in terms of being a person’s moral action. This distinction
is  significant  as  to  how  we  think  of  morality  in  writing  and
understanding.  Is  our  attitude  to  text  an  attitude  toward  another
person  or  an  abstracted  entity?  There  is  a  considerable  moral
difference  in  accusing  an  invention  for  being  «legally  or  morally»
irresponsible, and accusing a person for the same thing. One could not
easily say that a person is irresponsible in his writing without good
reasons  for  saying  so.  The  act  of  accusing  someone  for  being
irresponsible, even in theory, certainly calls into question the sincerity
of what we ourselves claim.
Finally, I must say what this means for the idea of historiography in
terms of  being,  as  Ricœur and Derrida  contend,  conditioned by this
indeterminate  invention  of  writing  (pharmakon)  that  needs  to  be
approached  with  suspicion.  Ricœur  constantly  falls  back  on  the
question – «[M]ust we not ask whether the writing of history, too, is
remedy or poison?» – which is derived from the general question of
writing  –  «[I]s  the  pharmakon of  writing  a  poison  or  a  remedy?»117
However, we do not come far if we think that the  morality of what
particular  people’s  written  words  mean  is  an  issue  that  could  be
settled  this  easily.  We  may,  for  sure,  say  that  a  particular
historiographical work (or argument) can be harmful for someone in
some situation, but this depends, among other things, on  what work
we have in mind, in what situation, whom it concerns, and what we may
mean by thinking of something as useful or harmful. Understanding
the difficulties and varieties of the situations where hiostoriographical
arguments  appear  is  to  deepen  our  moral  understanding;  we  look
again  at  what  a  person’s  words  may  mean  and  how  we  should
116 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 145.
117 RICŒUR 2006 [2000], 141, 499.
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respond to them.118 What I therefore ultimately put into question, here,
is whether it is reasonable to presume that there exists «an order of
discourse»  that  can  be  defined  and  regulated  philosophically,119 in
terms of what written words generally must be taken to involve. When
it  comes  to  our  moral  understanding  of  what  particular
historiographical  arguments  may  mean,  I  think  such  theoretical
regulations or statements are not valuable. Those presumptions rather
tend to disregard that our responsiveness to written words is part of a
genuine moral intercourse with other people.
References
BARTHES,  R.  1970  [1967].  «Historical  Discourse»,  in  M.  Lane  (ed.),
Structuralism: A Reader. London: Jonathan Cape.
— 1978 [1967]. «The Death of the Author», in Image, Music, Text. Trans.
By S. Heath. New York: Hill & Wang.
BAUMAN, Z. 1995. Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
BENARDETE, S. 1999.  Socrates and Plato: The Dialectics of Eros. München:
Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung.
BUDGE,  E.A.W.  1904.  The  Egyptians  or  Studies  in  Egyptian  Mythology:
Volume II. London: Mathuen & Co.
BURKERT, W. 2012 [1977]. Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical. Trans. By
J. Rafflan. Oxford: Blackwell.
CAPUTO, J.D. 1987.  Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and
the Hermeneutic Project. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
118 MURDOCH 1997 [1964], 313.
119 DERRIDA puts the rules of writing as «the rules of its game» in 1981 [1972], 63. Roland
BARTHES puts it as «the structure of discourse» in 1970 [1967], 154. Hayden WHITE puts it
as  «an  order  of  discourse»  in  2000  [1992],  28.  This  may  also  be  related  to  Michel
FOUCAULT’s somewhat different notion of «discourse» in 1971, 7-8.
Metodo Vol. 7, n. 2 (2019)
Is There a Problem of Writing in Historiography?                                       261
DE CERTEAU, M. 1988 [1975]. The Writing of History. Trans. By T. Conley.
New York: Columbia University Press.
COOK,  J.W.  1997.  Morality  and  Cultural  Differences. Oxford:  Oxford
University Press.
CRITCHLEY,  S.  1999.  The  Ethics  of  Deconstruction:  Derrida  and  Levinas.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
DANTO,  A.  1985  [1962].  «Narrative  Sentences», in  Narration  and
Knowledge. New York: Columbia University Press.
DERRIDA,  J.  1997  [1967].  Of  Grammatology.  Trans.  By  G.C.  Spivak.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
— 1981  [1972].  «Plato’s  Pharmacy»,  in  Dissemination.  Trans.  By  B.
Johnson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
— 1982 [1972].  «Signature,  Event, Context», in  Margins of Philosophy.
Trans. By A. Bass. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
— 1988. «Toward and Ethic of Discussion», in G. Graff (ed.),  Limited
Inc. Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
DILTHEY, W. 1989 [1883]. «Introduction to the Human Sciences», in R.A
Makkreel  &  F.  Rodi  (ed.),  Wilhelm  Dilthey  Selected  Works:  Vol.  I.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
ERMARTH,  E.D. 2011.  History in the Discursive Condition:  Reconsidering
the Tools of Thought. London & New York: Routledge.
FELSKI, R.  2015.  The  Limits  of  Critique.  Chicago  &  London:  The
University of Chicago Press.
FOUCAULT,  M.  1971.  «Order  of  Discourse».  Social  Science  Information,
10/2, 7-30.
GADAMER,  H-G.  1989  [1981].  «Reply  to  Jacques  Derrida»  in  D.P.
Michelfelder & R.E. Palmer (eds.),  Dialogue and Deconstruction: The
Gadamer-Derrida Encounter. New York: SUNY Press.
— 2006  [1960].  Truth  and  Method.  Trans.  By J.  Weinsheimer  & D.G.
Marshall. London & New York: Continuum.
GAITA, R. 1989. «The Personal in Ethics», in D.Z. Phillips & P. Winch
(ed.), Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars. UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
GIRARD,  R.  2001 [1999].  I See Satan Fall  Like Lightning.  Trans.  By J.G.
Williams. New York: Orbis Books.
Metodo Vol. 7, n. 2 (2019)
262                                                                                               Natan Elgabsi
GRISWOLD,  L.  1986.  Self-Knowledge  in Plato’s  Phaedrus.  New Haven &
London: Yale University Press.
VAN DER HEIDEN,  G-J.  2010.  The  Truth  (and  Untruth)  of  Language:
Heidegger,  Ricœur,  and  Derrida  on  Disclosure  and  Displacement.
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
HERTZBERG,  L.  1994.  «On  The  Attitude  of  Trust»,  in  The  Limits  of
Experience. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.
IRWIN,  T. 1995.  Plato’s Ethics. New York & Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
KOTWICK, M.E. 2016.  Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Text of Aristotele’s
Metaphysics. Berkeley: California Classical Studies.
KRONQVIST, C. 2019. «A Personal Love of the Good», Philosophia, 47/4,
977-994. 
LARSON,  K.  2009.  ‘Everything  important  is  to  do  with  passion’:  Iris
Murdoch’s Concept of Love and its Platonic Origin. Uppsala: University
of Uppsala.
LÉVINAS, E. 1979 [1961]. «Ethics and the Face», in  Totality and Infinity:
An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. By A. Lingis. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers.
LICHTHEIM,  M.  1976.  Ancient  Egyptian  Literature:  Volume  II:  The  New
Kingdom. Berkeley: University of California Press.
LØGSTRUP, K.E. 1997 [1956]. Ethical Demand. Trans. By T.I. Jensen. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
MILLER, J.H. 1987. «The Ethics of Reading». Style, 21/2, 181-191.
MOI,  T.  2017.  «Concepts:  Wittgenstein  and  Deconstruction»,  in  The
Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies after Wittgenstein, Austin,
and Cavell. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
MUNSLOW,  A.  2017.  «History,  Skepticism  and  the  Past», Rethinking
History, 21/4, 474-488.
MURDOCH,  I.  1997 [1957].  «Metaphysics  and Ethics», in  P.J.  Conradi
(ed.), Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature.
New York: Penguin Books.
— 2003 [1992]. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. London: Vintage.
— 1997  [1964].  «The  Idea  of  Perfection»,  in  P.J.  Conradi  (ed.),
Metodo Vol. 7, n. 2 (2019)
Is There a Problem of Writing in Historiography?                                       263
Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature. New
York: Penguin Books.
NEWTON-DE MOLINA,  D.  (ed.)  1976.  On Literary  Intention.  Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
NIETZSCHE,  F.  1910 [1874].  «The Use and Abuse of  History». In  The
Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Vol II: Thoughts Out of Season,
Part Two. Trans. By A. Collins. Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis.
PLATO. 1989 [n.d.]. «Epistle VII [The Seventh Letter]», in Plato IX. Trans.
By R.G. Bury. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
— 1953a [n.d.]. «Phaedo», in  Plato I. Trans. By H.N. Fowler. London:
William Heinemann Ltd.
— 1953b [n.d.] «Phaedrus», in Plato I. Trans. By H.N. Fowler. London:
William Heinemann Ltd.
PLUTARCH. 1967 [n.d.].  Plutarch’s Lives I: Theseus and Romulus, Lycurgus
and Numa, Solon and Publicola. Trans.  By B.  Perrin.  Cambridge &
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
RICŒUR, P. 2008 [1965]. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation.
Trans. By D. Savage. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
— 2006 [2000].  Memory, History, Forgetting. Trans. By K. Blamey & D.
Pellauer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
— 1981  [1971].  «The  Model  of  The  Text:  Meaningful  Action
Considered as a Text», in J.B. Thompson (ed.), Hermeneutics and The
Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— 1974  [1969].  «The  Problem  of  Double  Meaning  as  Hermeneutic
Problem and as Semantic Problem,’’ in The Conflict of Interpretations:
Essays  in  Hermeneutics,  Trans.  By  K.  McLaughlin.  Evanston:
Northwestern University Press.
— 1994  [1990].  «The  Self  as  an Ethical  Aim»,  in  Oneself  as  Another.
Trans. By K. Blamey. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
— 1981 [1970]. «What is Text: Explanation and Understanding», in J.B.
Thompson (ed.),  Hermeneutics and The Human Sciences. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
ROTH,  P.A.  2020. The  Philosophical  Structure  of  Historical  Explanation.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Metodo Vol. 7, n. 2 (2019)
264                                                                                               Natan Elgabsi
SCOTT-BAUMANN, A.  2009.  Ricœur  and  the  Hermeneutics  of  Suspicion.
London & New York: Continuum.
SEDGWICK,  E.K.  2003.  Touching Feeling:  Affect,  Pedagogy, Performativity.
Durham & London: Duke University Press.
SOURVINOU-INWOOD,  C.  1996.  ‘Reading’  Greek  Death:  To  the  End  of  the
Classical Period. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
STRANDBERG,  H.  2015.  Self-Knowledge  and  Self-Deception. Houndmills:
Palgrave MacMillan.
SVENBRO,  J.  1993  [1988].  Phrasikleia:  An  Anthropology  of  Reading  in
Ancient Greece. Trans. J. Loyd. Ithacha: Cornell University Press.
WEIL, S. 2002 [1949]. The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties
towards  Mankind.  Trans.  By  A.  Willis.  London  &  New  York:
Routledge.
WHITE,  H.  2000 [1992].  «Historical  Emplotment  and the  Problem of
Truth in Historical  Representation»,  in  Figural  Realism:  Studies  in
The Mimesis Effect. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
— 1973.  Metahistory:  The  Historical  Imagination  in  Nineteenth-Century
Europe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Metodo Vol. 7, n. 2 (2019)
